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ABSTRACT
In Russia, the consolidated tax regime was introduced in 2012 but in 2019 the decision 
was made to abolish it from 2023. The initial reform purported to discourage companies 
from using transfer pricing for domestic transactions between companies of one group 
and to ensure a more just allocation of the corporate income tax across Russian regions. 
In practice, however, the government’s shortfall in tax revenue reached two billion US 
dollars in certain years or 0.15% of Russia’s GDP. Our analysis has shown that the pub-
licly available data are, unfortunately, insufficient for assessing the success of this re-
form, in particular, whether the two above-mentioned goals were achieved. However, 
we can focus on the role the following two factors played in the budgetary losses. The 
first such factor is that profits and losses of group members can be consolidated within 
one accounting (fiscal) period. The second factor is that consolidated taxpayer groups 
shift their tax bases to regions with lower tax rates (in some cases, regions established 
tax preferences explicitly for the purpose of attracting members of these groups). These 
loopholes reveal the deficiencies of the Russian consolidation model: for example, the 
‘everybody or nobody’ principle is not applied in Russia and consolidated taxpayer 
groups are allowed to form the perimeter of tax consolidation themselves. In this paper, 
statistical tax reporting data are used to estimate the total amount of the shortfall in tax 
revenue caused by the regional tax preferences granted to members of consolidated 
taxpayer groups. In some cases, as our analysis of regional tax legislation shows, these 
tax preferences were intended to ‘steal’ the tax base from other regions or at least to 
prevent the regions’ own tax bases from being ‘stolen’ by rivals.  Judging by the total 
figures, regional tax competition had a negative influence on budgetary revenues. This, 
however, was not the main factor as the shortfall in revenue was mostly caused by the 
possibility of immediate offset of losses within consolidated taxpayer groups.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Россия ввела механизм налоговой консолидации в 2012 г., а уже в 2019 г. приня-
ла решение о его полной отмене, начиная с 2023 г. Вводя данный механизм в на-
логовое законодательство, правительство планировало устранить стимулы для 
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применения трансфертных цен по внутрироссийским операциям между ком-
паниями одной группы, а также обеспечить более справедливое распределение 
налога на прибыль между регионами России. На практике же оно столкнулось 
с выпадающими доходами бюджета, которые в определенные годы достигали 
двух миллиардов долларов США (0.15% от ВВП России). Авторы анализируют 
данные, доступные для независимого исследователя и делают вывод, что их не-
достаточно для оценки того, насколько были достигнуты две вышеупомянутые 
цели для бюджета, ради которых механизм консолидированных групп нало-
гоплательщиков и вводился. В то же время, существует возможность оценить 
вклад факторов, которые привели к потерям бюджета. Первым таким фактором 
является возможность суммирования прибылей и убытков между участниками 
одной консолидированной группы налогоплательщиков в рамках одного от-
четного (налогового) периода. Вторым же фактором является то, что консоли-
дированные группы налогоплательщиков перераспределяют свою налоговую 
базу в регионы с пониженной региональной ставкой налога на прибыль: в ряде 
случаев региональные льготы специально устанавливались для членов консо-
лидированных групп налогоплательщиков. Это возможно в силу ряда несо-
вершенств модели консолидации, используемой в России. К примеру, правило 
«все-или-никто» не действует в России, и группы могут произвольно формиро-
вать периметр налоговой консолидации. Авторы используют данные статисти-
ческих форм налоговой отчетности для определения общей величины выпа-
дающих доходов бюджета от предоставления региональных льгот участникам 
консолидированных групп налогоплательщиков. В ряде случаев региональное 
налоговое законодательство свидетельствует о том, что региональные льготы 
по налогу на прибыль вводились специально для того, чтобы «перетянуть» 
налоговую базу других регионов или, как минимум, предотвратить «перетя-
гивание» своей налоговой базы другими регионами. Итоговые цифры говорят 
о том, что региональная налоговая конкуренция имела негативное влияние на 
доходы бюджета. В то же время, это не было определяющим фактором. Основ-
ная сумма выпадающих доходов бюджета связана с возможностью мгновенного 
зачета убытков в рамках консолидированной группы налогоплательщиков.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговая консолидация, бюджетный федерализм, межрегиональная налого-
вая конкуренция, региональные льготы, выравнивание доходов
1. Introduction
The introduction of a consolidated tax 
base is now widely debated in relation to 
taxing the digital economy. In 2019, the 
OECD proposed to reallocate taxing rights 
in digital-oriented sectors, which came to 
be known as the Pillar One Unified Ap-
proach to Taxing. This initiative is ex-
pected to entail solutions that go beyond 
the arm’s length principle and to address 
the issue of fairness in terms of the appor-
tionment of IT giants’ tax base across the 
countries where they conduct their digital 
operations and prevent accumulation of 
profits in the jurisdictions engaging in ag-
gressive tax competition1. 
1 Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ 
under Pillar One: Public Consultation Document. 
Paris: OECD Publishing; 2019. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-con-
sultationdocument-secretariat-proposal-unified-
approach-pillar-one.pdf
The regime of tax consolidation in 
Russia is quite close to the one proposed 
by the European Commission, which 
makes the analysis of the Russian expe-
rience both theoretically and practically 
pertinent [1].
First, the reform affected the regional 
component of the corporate tax (up to 18% 
in 2009–2016 and up to 17% in 2017–2024). 
The corporate tax makes up the majority 
of regional tax revenue, accounting for 
about 30% of the revenue. The experience 
of the EU and Canada demonstrates that it 
is difficult to reconcile the interests of dif-
ferent regions if consolidated taxation en-
tails a substantial reallocation of their tax 
revenues [2; 3].
Second, the consolidated tax reform 
was deemed unsuccessful in Russia, 
which would in all probability entail the 
cancellation of the regime in 2023. Lear-
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ning from Russia’s mistakes could help 
the EU authorities to avoid similar pitfalls 
in the course of the forthcoming European 
tax reform, especially in addressing the 
problems that may occur as a result of re-
allocation of taxing rights among national 
jurisdictions. 
This study aims to describe the fiscal 
effects of the tax consolidation regime on 
the corporate tax base on the regional lev-
el and test the hypothesis about the com-
petition between Russian regions for the 
tax base of consolidated taxpayer groups. 
The tax consolidation regime was in-
troduced in order to reallocate corporate 
tax rights between Russian regions and 
thus discourage transfer pricing. There 
are, however, several limitations that im-
pede comprehensive analysis of the re-
form’s outcomes. 
Limitation 1. Lack of publicly available data 
on the reapportionment of the tax base across 
Russian regions
Estimating the reapportionment of the 
tax base across Russian regions is a chal-
lenging task since the size of the tax base 
for each region is determined by a variety 
of factors, which need to be taken into ac-
count apart from the apportionment for-
mula itself. It is necessary to evaluate each 
consolidated taxpayer group’s contribu-
tion to the tax base of each region, since 
these contributions can differ. Moreover, 
it is necessary to conduct factor analysis 
within each group, that is, describe and 
evaluate the reasons behind the changes 
in the tax base, for example, changes in 
sales volumes and prices, new tax prefer-
ences, offset of tax losses and so on, as well 
as the reasons behind the changes in the 
coefficient of tax allocation across the re-
gions, for example, realization of large in-
vestment projects in certain regions, com-
panies joining the consolidation perimeter 
and replacement of the indicator in the ap-
portionment formula. Ideally, we should 
be comparing the indicators that reflect 
possible changes in the tax bases of con-
solidated groups and their apportionment 
across Russian regions under the consoli-
dation regime and in the absence thereof. 
Such calculations, however, can be only 
made either by taxpayers themselves or 
by the Federal Tax Service, which has ac-
cess to taxpayers’ reporting data. 
The Ministry of Finance made calcula-
tions regarding the re-allocation of taxing 
rights by using the data provided by the 
Federal Tax Service. The Ministry, howe-
ver, provides the data only for 2012–2014, 
showing only the total number of regions 
that gained or lost from the tax consolida-
tion regime and the respective amount 
of their gains and losses2. The Ministry 
calculated these values as the difference 
between the corporate tax revenue under 
the consolidated tax regime and in the ab-
sence thereof, but provided no detailed 
description of the methodology. 
The report of the Accounts Chamber 
of 2012–2013 lists the regions that gained 
or lost the most after the regime was intro-
duced. The main ‘loser’ is Moscow region 
since it has by far incurred the biggest 
losses of all other Russian regions. 
Thus, the lack of public access to the 
necessary data impedes independent re-
search of the reform’s influence on the 
allocation of taxing rights across jurisdic-
tions in 2015–2019. 
Limitation 2. Lack of empirical evidence 
to assess the reform’s outcomes 
Intuitively, it is clear that the reform 
should be effective, although in the ab-
sence of the necessary data, it is difficult 
to empirically estimate the extent of the 
resulting tax base increase. Potentially its 
efficacy might be assessed by the follow-
ing analysis:
1. Calculate the changes in the tax 
base of consolidated taxpayer groups un-
der the consolidated tax regime and in the 
absence thereof (this is in fact the calcula-
tion made by the Ministry of Finance of 
Russia).
2. Determine all the factors that influ-
ence this indicator (apart from Factor 3 
‘Discouraging transfer pricing’) and esti-
mate their effects. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
Factors 1 and 2 reduce the resulting sum, 
while Factor 3 increases it.
2 Focus areas of the Russian tax policy in 
2016–2018.
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3. The contribution of Factor 3 ‘Dis-
couraging transfer pricing’ equals the dif-
ference between the sum and the other 
summands.
If at all possible, this procedure could 
be performed only by taxpayers them-
selves or by the Federal Tax Service. 
Thus, the available empirical evidence is 
obviously insufficient to evaluate the out-
comes of the reform regarding the two key 
goals set by the government. 
The last reservation that needs to be 
made is that in Russia, taxpayers have a 
right to decide whether their companies 
should join the consolidation perimeter 
or not (provided they meet the necessary 
criteria). Consolidated taxpayer groups, 
however, often tend not to disclose which 
companies are included in the consolida-
tion perimeter. Therefore, even though 
many members of consolidated groups 
are public companies with public report-
ing obligations, these data remain un-
available since the perimeter of the groups 
is unknown. 
Limitation 3. Lack of transparency regarding 
the losses of regional governments 
As far as we can see from the discus-
sions in government circles, Russian state 
authorities approach tax consolidation 
from a somewhat different perspective 
than the one described above. What mat-
ters most is the losses of regional consoli-
dated budgets due to the introduction of 
the consolidated tax regime: in 2012–2016, 
these losses amounted to 8, 16, 65, 126 and 
78 billion roubles each year respectively 
(estimates of the Ministry of Finance of Rus-
 
Change of the tax base
of consolidated taxpayer groups 
under tax consolidation
and in the absence thereof
Factor 3. Discouraging transfer 
pricing
Factor 4. Other factors (if any)
Factor 1. Immediate offset
of losses against profits inside 
consolidated taxpayer groups
Factor 2. Tax competition
of Russian regions for the tax base 
of consolidated taxpayer groups
Fig. 1. Factors that determine the indicator ‘Change of the tax base of consolidated 
taxpayer groups under consolidation and in the absence thereof’
sia). This means that the tax receipts from 
consolidated tax groups are lower than the 
revenues the budgets would have received 
if the mechanism of tax consolidation had 
not been implemented. In 2012–2015, re-
gional budgets faced a spike in losses. 
The Ministry of Finance contends that 
the decline in tax receipts may be caused 
by the following factors: the first is the im-
mediate offset of losses of some members 
with profits of others within consolidated 
taxpayer groups and the second is shifting 
of the tax base to those Russian regions 
that offer reduced corporate tax rates3. 
However, none of the available docu-
ments known to us provides a breakout of 
the factors causing the losses. 
It should be noted that the possibil-
ity of immediate offset of losses within 
consolidated taxpayer groups was some-
thing that could have been expected from 
the very beginning and it was even de-
scribed as one of the reform’s goals. It is, 
therefore, important to make a breakout 
of losses by factor.
The causes of losses identified by the 
Ministry of Finance correspond to Factor 
1 and Factor 2 as shown in Figure 1. The 
impact of Factor 1 ‘Immediate offset of 
losses against profits inside consolidated 
taxpayer groups’ cannot be estimated be-
cause the necessary data constitute tax se-
cret. Nevertheless, we are able to estimate 
the impact of Factor 2 ‘Tax competition of 
Russian regions for the tax base of consoli-
dated taxpayer groups’, at least its upper 
boundary. 
3 Focus areas of the Russian tax policy in 
2016–2018.
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As it was said above, the Ministry 
of Finance does not disclose its calcula-
tion methods, which means that we don’t 
know whether Factor 3 and Factor 4 were 
taken into account in the calculation of the 
general indicator. Since only Factors 1 and 
2 are mentioned, it can be supposed that 
the answer to this question is no. Theo-
retically, the effect of Factor 3 ‘Discourag-
ing transfer pricing’ should enhance the 
indicator ‘Change of the tax base of con-
solidated taxpayer groups under consoli-
dation and in the absence thereof’. Thus, 
Factor 3 should not cause an increase in 
losses of consolidated budgets under the 
tax regime but, on the contrary, lead to 
lower values in this indicator. If we sup-
pose that the impact of Factor 4 is insignif-
icant, the difference between the general 
indicator and Factor 2 estimate will reveal 
the lower threshold of Factor 1.
2. Literature review
In general, there is a considerable 
body of research on the subject of tax con-
solidation in Russia. These studies can be 
divided into three groups.
The first group (see, for example, [4–8]) 
includes studies that focus on the intro-
duction of the tax consolidation regime in 
Russia and the reasons behind this reform. 
Most of these studies were published in 
1997–2013, that is, the immediate pre- and 
post-reform period, until the first official 
estimates of the results were obtained. 
These studies consider the potential of tax 
consolidation in Russia, discuss the advan-
tages and setbacks of this measure. Most 
of them rely on international research evi-
dence and do not provide any empirical 
data of their own.
The second group comprises studies 
published after 2013. Many of them, in the 
way similar to that of the previous group, 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
tax consolidation [9; 10], mechanisms and 
types of consolidation used by different 
countries [11–13] as well as the budgetary 
implications for specific regions [14–17]. 
These studies explore the Russian expe-
rience of tax consolidation (which by the 
time of their publication had already been 
introduced in Russia) and compare it with 
international practices. They describe in 
detail the advantages and drawbacks of 
consolidation for taxpayers and the state 
budget. Some new shortcomings were 
detected after the regime was introduced 
and in the process of its implementation. 
These were primarily associated with le- 
gislative limitations (e.g. tax base for 
which tax is subject to consolidation; com-
panies entitled to benefit from the consoli-
dation regime; restrictions on offsetting 
losses and so on). 
These studies draw from the data 
published by the Ministry of Finance of 
Russia, mentioned above, and the reports 
of the Accounts Chamber of Russia on op-
eration of consolidated taxpayer groups in 
2012–2013. These studies do not provide 
empirical estimates of their own.
The third group consists of the stu-
dies that describe the possible improve-
ments to the existing consolidation mech-
anism [18; 19]. For instance, suggestions 
are made that membership in consoli-
dated taxpayer groups should be based 
on ‘everybody or nobody’ principle and 
that to enter these groups, members 
should meet the criteria ‘50% plus one’, 
that is, hold 50% plus one of the stocks 
in a company [20]. Some exceptions from 
the ‘everybody or nobody’ rule are pos-
sible if the volume of trade between the 
dependent legal entities is negligible [21]. 
Furthermore, it is proposed to exclude 
any possibilities of manipulations with 
the tax base distribution by setting rigo-
rous rules on how it should be calculated 
according to the existing formula.
The government’s decision to abo-
lish the consolidation tax regime in Russia 
was followed by a decline in scholarly at-
tention to this topic, although the reasons 
behind this decision still remain largely 
unexplored. 
Thus, our review of the research lite-
rature shows that there is considerable re-
search interest in the topic of consolidated 
taxation in Russia. Most studies, howe-
ver, do not provide empirical estimates of 
the reform’s consequences, which could 
be explained by the problem indicated 
above, namely the authors’ limited access 
to the data. 
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3. Data and methodology
Our analysis relies on the data of 
statistical reporting forms of the Federal 
Tax Service ‘5-PM’ and ‘5-KGN’ on tax 
base and accrued corporate tax in Rus-
sian regions. These forms are available on 
the agency’s web-site. Our analysis also 
draws from the data of the Federal Trea-
sury on corporate tax receipts, which in-
clude receipts from consolidated taxpayer 
groups to regional consolidated budgets.
These data can be used to calculate ef-
fective corporate tax rates in each region 
for taxpayers in general and for taxpayers 
from consolidated groups. The difference 
between the computed values and the max-
imum possible values of regional tax rates 
(in 2009–2016, 18%; in 2017, 17%) shows 
the extent of tax preferences that regional 
authorities are willing to grant to their tax-
payers. The results show that regions are 
actively competing with each other for the 
tax base of consolidated groups.
If a region’s effective corporate tax 
rate for members of consolidated taxpayer 
groups is below the maximum level, it 
means that this region offers special tax 
preferences for members of such groups. 
If a region’s effective corporate rate for 
members of consolidated taxpayer groups 
is lower than the rate for all taxpayers, it 
means that members of consolidated tax-
payer groups enjoy more tax preferences 
in this region than other companies. In 
this case, the region should be checked for 
tax preferences for consolidated groups. If 
we compare the dynamics of the tax rate 
for consolidated taxpayer groups and the 
corresponding tax base, we may find that 
the tax base has been shifted to the regions 
with lower rates, although to prove this 
fact, we need to look at the regional tax 
legislation, budgetary and tax policy re-
ports to find what caused these changes. 
Our study covers the period of 2012–
2018 and the first half of 2019.
4. Results 
4.1. Dynamics of corporate tax receipts 
from consolidated taxpayer groups
Table 1 shows the data on corporate 
tax receipts of regional governments in 
absolute values and in proportion to GDP 
from 2009 to the first half of 2019. The 
data illustrate that corporate tax receipts 
declined in 2012–2015 (as a percentage of 
GDP), which can be partially explained 
by adverse global economic and political 
conditions. Nevertheless, corporate tax re-
ceipts from organizations outside the con-
solidated taxpayer groups started to rise 
in 2016 and in 2017 they almost reached 
the level of 2012. In 2016–2017, consolidat-
ed taxpayer groups paid noticeably less 
corporate taxes than in 2012, which was a 
disturbing trend if seen from the perspec-
tive of budget revenues in the first half of 
2018. In 2018, receipts from consolidated 
groups (as a percentage of GDP) almost 
reached the level of 2012 and in the first 
half of 2019, even exceeded it. 
It should be noted that the corporate 
tax revenue (including consolidated tax-
payer groups) in the given period reached 
its maximum in 2018–2019.
Before making any conclusions, it is 
necessary to clarify the reasons behind 
the downward trend demonstrated by 
corporate tax receipts from consolidated 
groups in 2013–2017. This trend may re-
side in the mechanism of consolidation 
itself (for example, offset of losses within 
a group or reduced tax rates offered by 
regions to participants of consolidated 
groups) or in the macro-economic situa-
tion in the sectors group members belong 
to. The latter supposition about the role 
played by sector-specific characteristics of 
consolidated groups is supported by the 
fact that 14 out of 16 groups are engaged 
in oil and gas and metallurgical industries 
and there are no banks among them. 
4.2. Reduced corporate tax rates 
for consolidated taxpayer groups in Russian 
regions
While the regime was in force, that is, 
from 2012 to 2019, from 14 (in 2012 and 
2019) to 24 (in 2018) Russian regions of-
fered reduced corporate tax rates to mem-
bers of consolidated taxpayer groups. In 
this period, 31 regions offered some kind 
of tax preferences to consolidated tax-
payer groups and in 13 regions, the effec-
tive tax rate was reduced by 2 percentage 
points or more. The remaining 52 out of 
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Table 1
Corporate tax receipts of regional governments from all taxpayers and from 
consolidated taxpayer groups in 2009–2019
Period 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
Corporate tax 
receipts of regional 
budgets, bln rbs
1067.9 1517,8 1926.3 1977.0 1702.6 1901.1 1981.1 2205.5 2489.8 3069.6 1723.5
% of GDP 2.55 3.04 3.20 2.90 2.33 2.40 2.38 2.56 2.71 2.96 3.40
including receipts 
from consoli-
dated taxpayer 
groups, bln rbs
– – – 432.0 397.2 415.2 395.4 365.0 420.2 625.8 333.4
% of GDP – – – 0.63 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.46 0.60 0.66
including 
receipts from 
non-members 
of consolidated 
taxpayer groups, 
bln rbs
– – – 1544.9 1305.4 1485.9 1585.6 1840.5 2069.6 2443.8 1390.1
% of GDP – – – 2.27 1.78 1.88 1.90 2.14 2.25 2.35 2.74
Number of 
regions offering 
reduced rates 
for consolidated 
taxpayer groups**
– – – 14 16 15 16 20 23 24 14
Their share in 
the tax base of 
consolidated 
taxpayer groups, %
– – – 41.5 49.4 56.6 61.4 31.5 59.8 67.4 21.4
Share of the 
Khanty-Mansiysk 
Autonomous Dis-
trict and Leningrad 
region in the tax 
base of consoli-
dated taxpayer 
groups, %
– – – 13.3 15.2 37.2 35.0 4.8 8.2 24.1 4.9
Amount of shorfall 
in revenue due to 
reduced rates, bln 
rbs
– – – 20.4 18.6 45.2 39.9 5.6 12.3 38.0 8.1
including 
Khanty-Mansi-
ysk Autonomous 
District and Len-
ingrad region, 
bln rbs
– – – 10.5 11.4 36.1 31.6 1.4 4.9 25.7 0.8
Note: * The data of 2019 covers only the first six months; ** Including the regions with the effective 
tax rate lower than the maximum at least by 0.05%.
Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of the data of the Federal Tax Service of Russia.
83 Russian regions that had consolidated 
taxpayer groups always applied the maxi-
mum corporate tax rate to these groups 
(18% in 2017; since 2017, 17%). 
The shortfall in corporate tax revenue 
from consolidated taxpayer groups in the 
given period was largely determined by 
the choices made by specific regions, pri-
marily Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous 
District and to some extent Leningrad 
region (Fig. 2). The remaining 29 regions 
that in different periods granted tax pref-
erences to consolidated taxpayer groups 
accounted for 4.2 to 12.2. billion roubles 
(that is, not more than 0.01% of GDP) of 
tax expenditures. 
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It should be noted that this sum com-
prises the tax expenditures from all tax 
preferences in the regions, including in-
dustry-specific tax benefits. Therefore, in 
our study, this sum will be used as the up-
per threshold value to evaluate the effects 
of the fierce competition between Russian 
regions. 
4.3. Reduced corporate tax rates  
in Russian regions
In this section, we are going to con-
centrate on the tax losses resulting from 
lower rates offered by certain regions to 
members of consolidated taxpayer groups 
(CTGs) (the so-called ‘CTG-based prefer-
ences’). By CTG-based preferences we 
mean special tax rates offered to members 
of consolidated taxpayer groups or, on 
the contrary, to those organizations that 
choose not to join consolidated taxpayer 
groups, in other words, tax preferences re-
lated to the tax consolidation regime. 
In Leningrad region, for instance, 
since 2012, the reduced corporate tax rate 
has been 14% for those oil and gas com-
panies that belong to consolidated tax-
payer groups, provided that one or sev-
eral members of the group and (or) their 
subsidiaries are established in the terri-
tory of the region. In Arkhangelsk region, 
the reduced rate is available for members 
of consolidated taxpayer groups specia-
lizing on diamond mining and wholesale 
trade of precious gemstones. We can sup-
pose that this strategy was chosen by the 
regions that were hoping for tax receipt 
gains if enterprises on their territories 
joined consolidated taxpayer groups.
Some regions offered lower tax rates 
to companies in exchange for non-joining 
consolidated taxpayer groups. For ex-
ample, in Krasnoyarsk region and in the 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), reduced cor-
porate tax rates were applied to the sums 
paid to regional budgets by the organiza-
tions in the crude oil and associated gas 
(exploration and production) industry 
that were not members of consolidated 
groups. It can be supposed that this mea-
sure was used by the regions to prevent 
tax revenue losses which would occur if 
certain companies established in their 
territories decided to join consolidated 
groups. This fact is supported by our anal-
ysis of the regional legislation. According 
to the Ministry of Industry and Geology 
of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), such 
approach would be conducive to fairer re-
allocation of the corporate tax rights and 
the republic would not lose its tax receipts 
since they cannot be redirected to cover 
the consolidated group members’ losses 
in other regions. 
These examples are quite illustrative 
of the tax competition between Russian 
regions for the tax base of consolidated 
taxpayer groups.
The analysis of regional tax legislation 
of 2012–2018 has revealed the following 
regions that granted ‘pro-CTG’ prefer-
ences: the city of Moscow, the Republic 
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of Komi and Sakha (Yakutia), Arkhan-
gelsk, Irkutsk, Leningrad, Samara and 
Saratov regions, Yamalo-Nenetsk and 
Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous districts, 
Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Stavropol and 
Khabarovsk regions. 
After the adjustment, this sum still re-
mains the upper limit (although it is a bit 
lower than the result of the previous itera-
tion) rather than an accurate estimate of 
the effects of reallocation of taxing rights 
among Russian regions and the reduced 
tax rates they apply. For a more accurate 
estimation we would need the breakout of 
tax revenues by type of regional tax pref-
erences or by type of taxpayers entitled to 
such preferences. 
Further in our study we are going to 
focus on the case of Khanty-Mansiysk Au-
tonomous District. 
4.4. Consolidated tax regime 
in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Dis-
trict (further referred to as KhMAD) has 
been the most generous in terms of tax 
preferences for members of consolidated 
taxpayer groups. The shortfall in corpo-
rate tax revenue from consolidated tax 
groups in 2012-2018 varied between 0% 
(in 2016) to 65% (in 2015) and on average 
was 44.60% from the total shortfall in cor-
porate tax revenue in all Russian regions 
(Table 2). 
Tax preferences for members of con-
solidated taxpayer groups specializing in 
oil and gas production were introduced 
by the law of KhMAD-Yugra № 23-оз 
of 31.03.2012, that is, three months after 
the regime came into force. The law took 
effect on 01.01.2012. This measure was 
justified by the need to stimulate organi-
zations to create consolidated taxpayer 
groups in KhMAD to increase the re-
gion’s tax revenue.
Despite the fact that this tax prefer-
ence was in effect in 2012–2018, a signifi-
cant growth in the tax base was observed 
only in 2014–2015 and in 2018. It should 
be noted that in KhMAD, effective tax 
rates are set low not only for consolidated 
groups but for other types of taxpayers as 
well, although the former still enjoy more 
tax benefits. This can be explained if we 
take a closer look at which companies 
joined consolidated taxpayer groups and 
which didn’t: the average value of effec-
tive rates for all taxpayers in 2009–2011 
was 14.9%, which is exactly the same as in 
2012–2018. 
Our analysis shows that changes in 
the shortfall of KhMAD’s tax revenues 
due to tax preferences granted to mem-
bers of consolidated tax groups correlates 
with the changes in the corporate tax base 
of the companies that had licenses for oil-
field development in this region. A spike 
in tax losses in 2014–2015 was linked to 
improvements in the financial perfor-
mance of the largest taxpayers, which, in 
their turn, were caused by an increase in 
their revenue from non-sale operations 
due to the rising dollar. 
The tax consolidation regime in Kh-
MAD had either a neutral (2012) or nega-
tive (2013, 2018) effect on the region’s 
budget revenues. Unfortunately, the re-
gional authorities do not publish the data 
for other years. 
We believe that there is a high prob-
ability that the above-described sharp in-
crease in tax losses 2014–2015 in KhMAD 
is associated with the operations of the cor-
porate taxpayer group ‘Surgutneftegaz’ 
Table 2
Indicators of consolidated taxpayer groups’ performance in KhMAD
Indicator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Effective corporate tax rates for members of consoli-
dated taxpayer groups, %
14.9 14.7 14.2 14.2 17.9 14.5 14.2
Effective corporate tax rates for non-members of con-
solidated taxpayer groups, %
15.2 15.7 15.4 15.1 15.6 14.7 13.9
Tax rates difference (tax rates for members minus tax 
rates for non-members), %
–0.3 –1.0 –1.2 –0.9 2.3 –0.2 0.3
Corporate tax base for consolidated taxpayer groups, 
bln rbs
303 291.5 753.8 679.4 53.6 149.3 764.0
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(further referred to as CTG ‘Surgutneft-
egaz’). This supposition could be con-
firmed if we had access to the following 
data: 
(a) companies included in the consoli-
dation perimeter; 
(b) financial performance data of CTG 
‘Surgutneftegaz’; 
c) coefficient of allocation of corpo-
rate taxes paid by CTG ‘Surgutneftegaz’ 
to the regions where the group’s enter-
prises operate; 
d) share of tax revenues from CTG 
‘Surgutneftegaz’ in KhMAD’s overall cor-
porate tax revenue. 
The assessed corporate tax paid by 
the group to the governments of KhMAD 
and Leningrad region correlates with the 
values of the current corporate tax paid 
by the company ‘PAO Surgutneftegaz’. 
There was a dramatic increase in these 
indicators in 2014–2015 and 2018, when 
the company got substantial income on its 
foreign-currency deposits due to positive 
foreign exchange differences. A sharp fall 
in these indicators in 2016–2017, when the 
rouble grew stronger, led to a significant 
decrease in profits in 2017 and in 2016, to 
zero values (Fig. 3).
It is interesting that despite the fact 
that ‘PAO Surgutneftegaz’ is one of the 
largest taxpayers in both regions, we ob-
serve similar dynamics of indicators in 
both regions (except for 2013). In other 
words, even if one of these regions sup-
posedly ‘stole’ the tax base of CTG ‘Sur-
gutneftegaz’ from the other, it had no per-
ceivable effect on regional tax revenues. 
It should be noted that KhMAD had 
granted corporate tax preferences to oil 
and gas companies long before the con-
solidated tax regime was introduced. For 
instance, in 2007–2011 the nominal corpo-
rate tax rate in the region for this category 
of companies was 13.5–14% with the max-
imum rate of 17.5–18%. The only require-
ment companies had to meet to become 
eligible for this tax benefit was to spend 
funds on natural resource development or 
to invest in capital assets. Moreover, since 
there were no quantitative requirements, 
companies could make expenditures in ac-
cordance with their own plans and needs. 
The average effective corporate tax rate in 
the region in 2007–2011 was 14.5–15% and 
it remained at the same level in 2012–2018 
(see Table 3).
Based on the above, the following 
conclusions can be made. 
First, a dramatic rise in corporate tax 
losses faced by KhMAD due to the rate 
reduction in certain years was caused by 
the significant growth in the tax base in 
the same years and by the fact that tax 
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Table 3
Effective corporate tax rate in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District
Period 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Effective corporate 
tax rate, %
14.4 14.5 14.6 15.2 15.0 15.1 15.2 14.6 14.5 15.9 14.6 14.1
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preferences were granted to those taxpay-
ers that enjoyed such tax base growth. The 
tax base grew as a result of the increase in 
these companies’ non-sales revenue from 
foreign currency deposits. The reverse is 
also true: the region lost less tax revenue 
when the corporate tax base of organiza-
tions entitled to tax preferences started 
to decline. Second, members of consoli-
dated taxpayer groups were entitled to 
preferences throughout the whole tax 
consolidation period, not in specific years. 
Third, KhMAD had started to grant tax 
preferences to oil and gas companies long 
before the regime was introduced. The 
average effective corporate tax rate for all 
taxpayers in 2009–2011 was the same as in 
2012–2018.
Thus, the hypothesis that the dramat-
ic expansion of the tax base in KhMAD 
in 2014–2015 and in 2018 was caused by 
this region’s ‘stealing’ of the tax base from 
other regions is not confirmed.
4.5. Analysis of the shortfall in corporate 
tax revenue after the adjustments
Table 4 summarizes our calculations 
of the maximum possible shortfall in rev-
enue of regional governments due to re-
allocation of the corporate tax base to re-
gions with tax preferences for members of 
consolidated taxpayer groups. 
First, we calculated the total shortfall 
in tax revenues due to tax preferences 
granted to members of consolidated tax 
groups. Then we adjusted the resulting 
value, focusing only on those regions that 
offered special ‘pro-CTG’ preferences. 
Then we conducted detailed analysis of 
KhMAD’s legislation and other related 
indicators and found no evidence that 
the dramatic expansion of the region’s tax 
base in 2014–2015 and in 2018 happened 
because the region was ‘stealing’ the tax 
base from other regions by attracting tax-
payers with the help of tax preferences. 
KhMAD’s special ‘pro-CTG’ preference 
alone cannot be seen as a loss resulting 
from the application of the consolidated 
tax regime. In fact, this region had been 
offering reduced corporate tax rates to oil 
and gas companies long before the regime 
was introduced and, therefore, this mea-
sure did not affect the average effective 
rate in the region. 
The estimates we obtained at the third 
stage do not exceed 13.4 billion roubles a 
year (as of 2014). This value is an extreme-
ly conservative estimate of the shortfall 
in revenue resulting from shifting of the 
tax base of consolidated taxpayer groups 
to regions with lower tax rates. In addi-
tion to ‘pro-CTG’ preferences, this sum 
comprises other tax benefits in the given 
Table 4
Calculations of the maximum possible shortfall in revenue due to re-allocation 
of the corporate tax base to regions with reduced tax preferences
Indicator Period 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 first half 
of 2019
Shortfall in corporate tax revenue of re-
gional governments due to tax preferences 
to consolidated taxpayer groups, bln rbs
20.4 18.6 45.2 39.9 5.6 12.3 38.0 8.1
Shortfall in corporate tax revenue of re-
gional governments due to tax preferences 
to members of consolidated taxpayer groups 
in regions with special ‘pro-CTG’ prefe-
rences, bln rbs
18.3 15.1 42.0 37.5 3.7 9.0 31.3 1.5
Shortfall in corporate tax revenue of regio-
nal governments due to tax preferences 
to members of consolidated taxpayer groups 
in regions with special ‘pro-CTG’ preferen-
ces, with the exception of KhMAD, bln rbs
8.8 5.6 13.4 11.7 3.7 5.3 10.0 1.5
Losses of the consolidated regional budget 
due to the consolidated tax regime, as 
estimated by the Ministry of Finance, bln rbs
8 16 65 126 78 n.a. n.a. n.a.
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regions as it is impossible to break out the 
losses in regional tax revenue by category 
of preferences in tax statistical reporting.
The shortfall in corporate tax revenue 
hovered around 0.09% of GDP before the 
regime was introduced as well as after-
wards, which means that the amount of 
revenue lost due to the application of re-
duced tax rates is negligible (Fig. 4).
5. Discussion 
Analysis of the goals of the consoli-
dated tax regime introduced in 2012 and 
its outcomes as of the second half of 2019 
(Table 5) has demonstrated that three 
goals out of four were either fulfilled 
(simplification of tax administration; con-
solidation of losses and profits of group 
members) or partially fulfilled (fair appor-
tionment of the tax base across regions). 
From the perspective of tax administra-
tion, the problem of transfer pricing was 
solved although we do not have enough 
evidence to evaluate the role of this step 
in the overall reapportionment of the tax 
base across jurisdictions. 
The main drawback of the consoli-
dated tax regime is considered to be the 
increasing losses in tax revenue, which 
may be caused by losses offset within con-
solidated taxpayer groups or by regional 
tax competition.
Our results show that out of 293 bil-
lion roubles lost by regional budgets in 
2012–2016 due to the tax preferences of-
fered to consolidated tax groups, the loss 
of at least 250 billion was caused by the 
immediate offset of losses between mem-
bers of consolidated taxpayer groups. It 
should be noted that this figure is an ex-
tremely conservative estimate and the role 
of this factor is even more significant. On 
the other hand, the scale of losses could be 
predicted from the very beginning. More-
over, the immediate offset of losses be-
tween members of consolidated taxpayer 
groups was initially declared to be one of 
the goals of the reform. We can suppose 
that the legislators misjudged the amount 
of losses as they were using the pre-crisis 
figures. This hypothesis is supported by 
the fact that before the recession year of 
2014, the losses of regional governments 
due to the tax preferences for consolidat-
ed taxpayer groups had been quite low – 
8 billion roubles in 2012 and 16 billion 
roubles in 2013. Most losses occurred in 
2014 and in the following years.
This supposition agrees with the 
words of S.D. Shatalov, who was the 
Deputy Finance Minister in 2000–2015: 
‘Not only consolidation is an economi-
cally sound solution but it also contributes 
to fairer allocation of the corporate tax 
among regions’ [22]. He also pointed out 
that ‘this new institution emerged not in 
the period of economic growth but with a 
considerable delay, which aggravated the 
problems of interbudgetary relationships 
even more, because the losses of indivi- 
dual consolidated group members de-
crease the general revenue of the whole 
group and, therefore, the amount of tax to 
be reallocated’ [22].
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Table 5
Comparison of the reform’s declared goals in 2012 and its outcomes as of the second 
half of 2019
Goal Result New shortcomings Solutions to the new 
shortcomings 
A fairer ap-
portionment 
of the tax base
The goal was mostly 
achieved after the first two 
years.
No publicly available data 
for the other years.
The proportion of winners 
to losers was as follows: 
65 against 18 in 2012; 63 
against 20 in 2013; and 53 
against 32 in 2014.
The biggest ‘loser’ is the 
city of Moscow.
Apart from the major ‘profit 
centres’ – the cities of Mos-
cow and St. Petersburg, the 
list of 'losers' also includes 
other Russian regions.
–
Discourag-
ing transfer 
pricing to 
minimize the 
corporate tax
Theoretically, this goal 
was achieved. 
Participants of consoli-
dated taxpayer groups no 
longer need to use transfer 
pricing since a formulaic 
approach is applied to the 
corporate tax allocation. 
No empirical data avail-
able.
Our analysis detected 
competition for consolidated 
tax groups' tax base among 
Russian regions. The groups 
can to some extent influ-
ence their tax base allocation 
across the regions.  Therefore, 
companies can reallocate a 
part of their group's tax base 
to the regions with better tax 
preferences while the compa-
nies' financial results remain 
virtually unchanged.
Consolidated groups can take 
advantage of the following 
loopholes to influence their 
tax base allocation:  first, 
membership of these groups 
is formed and changed in an 
arbitrary fashion; second, the 
indicator reflecting the factor 
‘labour’ in the apportionment 
formula is also determined 
and changed arbitrarily; and, 
third, groups can influence 
their membership through 
reorganization and so on.
Starting from 1 January 2023, 
Russian regions will not be 
able to use reduced corporate 
tax rates, except for the cases 
that the federal legislation 
explicitly provides for. Thus, 
regions will have less op-
portunities for engaging in 
interregional tax competition.
The remaining opportunities 
will be eliminated or mini-
mized by further improve-
ments to the tax legislation.
For instance, it is proposed 
to deny consolidated taxpay-
er groups the opportunity 
to determine the apportion-
ment factor (wage fund or 
average payroll count). Sec-
ond, both indicators should 
be included in the apportion-
ment formula with equal 
weights (1/4) assigned to 
each. Another possible mea-
sure is to establish a tougher 
control over formation of the 
consolidation perimeter.
Facilitation of 
tax adminis-
tration 
Achieved. 
Participants of consolidated 
taxpayer groups act as a 
single taxpayer. Facilitation 
of tax administration for the 
taxpayer and tax authori-
ties. Tax authorities do not 
have to control companies' 
compliance with the rules 
of transfer pricing in do-
mestic transactions.
Increasing uncertainty in 
regional budget forecasts.
Corporate tax receipts 
depend not only on the fi-
nancial results of companies 
in the jurisdiction but also 
on the performance of the 
whole consolidated group.
Consolidated taxpayer 
groups are now obliged 
to report the forecast tax 
receipts to regional budgets 
in the current financial year, 
ensuing year and planning 
period as well as the factors 
that determine the planned 
corporate tax receipts.
Consolidation 
of profits and 
losses of the 
members of 
consolidated 
taxpayer 
groups to 
calculate the 
corporate tax 
base. 
Achieved. The federal government was 
unprepared for the massive 
losses in tax revenue when 
regions started taking ad-
vantage of this opportunity.  
In other words, the achieve-
ment of this goal turned out 
to be the regime’s drawback.
Since 2017, there has been a 
rule that losses of the previ-
ous years can be offset only 
against 50% of the tax base. 
The remaining 50% of the tax 
base is subject to tax. This 
restriction applies to consoli-
dated taxpayer groups and 
to other taxpayers.
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As our analysis shows, a substantial 
decline in tax receipts from consolidated 
taxpayer groups was in all probability 
caused by the general economic situation, 
which affected all Russian companies, and 
by now this downturn is all but over. At 
the end of 2019, corporate tax revenues 
from consolidated tax groups were ex-
pected to exceed the amount of the corpo-
rate tax paid by these companies in 2012, 
that is, 0.63% of GDP.
If the consolidated tax regime is fully 
eliminated, there will arise other prob-
lems besides those we have been consid-
ering in this paper. First, elimination of 
the consolidated tax regime in combina-
tion with limiting the perimeter of inter-
nal transfer pricing virtually brings us 
back to the practices of corporate tax ap-
portionment before 2012, that is, to the 
situation when large vertically integrated 
corporations could influence allocation of 
taxing rights and there were no allocation 
rules set on the state level. Second, after 
the regime is cancelled, the tax base will 
be re-allocated, which means that there 
will be more losers than winners among 
the regions and the losers will end up with 
diminished corporate tax revenues. This 
situation will undoubtedly give rise to a 
more heated debate in the future. 
6. Conclusions
Due to the lack of publicly available 
empirical data, it is quite difficult to evalu-
ate the reform’s progress, in particular to 
compare the goals with what has been 
actually achieved. The declared goals of 
the reform were to ensure a fairer appor-
tionment of the tax base across Russian re-
gions and to discourage transfer pricing in 
large holding companies. Most concerns 
about this regime are associated with the 
declining corporate tax revenues from 
companies belonging to the perimeter of 
consolidated taxpayer groups. 
The decline in tax receipts could be 
determined by the two factors: first, the 
immediate offset of some members’ losses 
against the profits of others within consol-
idated taxpayer groups and, second, shift-
ing of the consolidated tax base to those 
Russian regions that offered reduced 
rates. Thus, the source of the problems re-
sides in the defects of the current tax con-
solidation regime.
Our analysis of regional legislation 
shows that regions compete with each 
other for the tax base of consolidated tax-
payer groups, offering them reduced tax 
rates. These measures are aimed at ‘steal-
ing’ the tax base from other regions or pre-
venting them from doing so. 
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